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INTRODUCTION
Something is amiss in our current due process doctrine. While
the last thirty years have seen a tremendous expansion in the scope of
property encompassed by procedural due process, there has been one
notable exception: service and supply public contracts. Accordingly,
while individuals employed under fixed-term employment contracts
enjoy at least minimal due process rights, others employed under
fixed-term service contracts have no procedural guarantees of employ-
ment. Although both categories of employees would have an equally
valid contract law claim if terminated without justification, only the
former has a constitutional claim under the Due Process Clause. Dis-
turbingly, courts have not been able to explain why this is so; indeed,
as of late, they have ceased the endeavor altogether.
The Constitution requires that when the government deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property, it must first afford that individual
due process of law.' The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that
t B.A., Yale University, 1999; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2004.
1 The Fifth Amendment, which mandates that the federal government abide by cer-
tain procedures, reads: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
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the Due Process Clause protects more than just real and personal
property-rather, property "denotes a broad range of interests." 2 Ac-
cordingly, the Court has recognized a degree of protected interest in
diverse categories of property, including continued welfare benefits,3
tenured government employment,4 driver's licenses, 5 and continued
utility services.
6
In regard to service and supply contracts with the government,
however, courts have been hesitant to expand the procedural protec-
tions of due process. 7 This has been due in part to a general notion
that the property interests in such contracts are less deserving of con-
stitutional protection, either because they are not sufficiently similar
to traditional forms of protected property (e.g., one's car),8 or be-
cause they do not engender the same level of reliance as some forms
of nontraditional property that have been afforded protection (e.g.,
one's statutory benefits).9 Further, because cases involving such con-
tracts readily lend themselves to traditional contract law analysis, due
process concerns may be muted. The denial of process may be com-
fortably conceived of as a mere breach of contract, for which the ap-
propriate remedy is a suit for contractual damages rather than a civil
rights claim under § 1983.10
This Note argues that the current approach to the procedural
due process concerns raised by contractual relations with the govern-
ment is problematic. The distinction drawn between those types of
out due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified
in 1868, similarly constrains state governments: "[N] or shall any [s] tate deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." Id. amend. XIV, § 1. Because
the procedural requirements of both amendments are substantially the same, this Note
refers generally to the requirements of due process without distinction.
2 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
3 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
4 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
5 See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
6 See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978).
7 See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 577-78 (finding no protected property interest in a gov-
ernment employment contract that was guaranteed for only one year).
8 See, e.g., Vail v. Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435, 1453 (7th Cir. 1983) (PosnerJ., dissent-
ing) (explaining that "[y]ou have a property right against (most) deliberate takings of your
car[,] but not against its being demolished in an accidental collision").
9 See, e.g., Tucker v. Darien Bd. of Educ., 222 F. Supp. 2d 202, 206-07 (D. Conn.
2002) (finding that a public employee had no protected property interest in medical bene-
fits under a collective bargaining agreement); Rite Aid of Pa., Inc. v. Houstoun, 998 F.
Supp. 522, 530-31 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (finding that a pharmacy under contract with the state
to provide prescription drugs to Medicare patients at a specific cost did not have a pro-
tected property interest in having the state continue its reimbursements at a particular
rate).
10 Section 1983 provides aggrieved individuals with a private right of action against
state officials who, "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any [s] tate," deprive them of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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contracts for which the courts have accorded due process protec-
tion, l I and those for which the courts have denied protection, 12 is un-
sound in theory and inconsistent in practice. Courts, perhaps in
recognition of these difficulties, have attempted a resolution by plac-
ing greater emphasis on the question of what process is due, rather
than on the nature of the interest at stake. The result has generally
been that courts find very little process due.
13
Although courts have typically limited government contractors'
due process claims to breach of contract suits, their rationale for do-
ing so has generally been unpersuasive. In many cases, postdepriva-
tion remedies are not necessarily congruent with the procedural
guarantees of due process. Some breach of contract cases may well
belong in federal courts, and these should be properly conceived of as
breach of process cases, rather than as simple contract disputes.
Courts and commentators often endeavor to distinguish government
contracts by arguing that when the government participates in the
marketplace, external constraints are sufficient to guarantee adequate
process. 14 However, this argument is problematic because it both un-
derestimates the value of process and overestimates the constraining
forces of the market. Finally, the inconsistency that results from at-
tempts to find some principled distinction, however laudable, threat-
ens to undermine the doctrine as a whole.
Part I of this Note briefly traces the rise of modern procedural
due process jurisprudence, and highlights the particular difficulty of
government contracts within that context. Part II analyzes the Court's
most recent ruling in this arena, Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc.
15
Part III argues that G & G Fire Sprinklers represents an unsettling trend
that warrants close scrutiny. Next, Part III criticizes the traditional jus-
tifications for the current approach, and suggests guidelines which
would resolve at least some of the existing inconsistencies.
I1 For example, the courts have generally afforded protection to interests in tenured
employment contracts. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (holding that a
de facto tenure program entitled employee to procedural protections).
12 The courts have, for example, generally denied protection to interests in service
contracts. See, e.g., S & S Research, Inc. v. Paulszcyk, No. 01-2456, slip op. at 746 (7th Cir.
Aug. 14, 2002) (holding that a de facto tenure program did not entitle a government
service provider to procedural protections).
13 See, e.g., DeBoer v. Pennington, 287 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that a state
court suit for breach of contract is sufficient process where there has been no denial of a
present entitlement); S & D Maint. Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1988) (reaching
the same conclusion on similar facts).
14 See infra Part III.C.
15 532 U.S. 189 (2001).
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DUE PROCESS AND THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC CONTRACTS
The analytical framework for determining whether an interest is
protected by due process, and if so, what process is due, is relatively
well settled. 16 As the text of the Due Process Clause suggests, success-
ful claimants must show that the government deprived them of (1) a
protected property interest, (2) without appropriate procedural guar-
antees.1 7 In each of these prongs, however, the status of government
contracts raises particularly troublesome concerns that have made ar-
ticulation of consistent principles difficult.
A. Determining the Scope of Constitutional Property
Due process is an ancient doctrine.' 8 Yet its current procedural
application is of recent vintage, arising in response to the growth of
the administrative state 9 and, perhaps necessarily related to that
growth, from a more expansive understanding of what constitutes
property in the modem era.20 Traditional common law notions of
property, which had served well to distinguish the inviolate rights of
ownership from the mere privileges of enjoyment,2 ' became of little
use to courts grappling with contemporary problems of due process.2 2
16 To be sure, substantial disagreement exists as to the range of interests afforded
protection (i.e., as to the substantive meaning of life, liberty, and property), as well as to
the degree of procedural protection that is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional require-
ments. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing "Revolution" and "Reform". Procedural Due
Process and theNew Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 591 (1998); RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., TheDue
Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973 (1996). But the approach
outlined above is generally well accepted. See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK,
TRE.ATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.5 (3d ed. 1999) (dis-
cussing the due process constitutional framework).
17 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
18 See MAGNA CARTA ch. 39 (1215), reprinted inJ.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 327 (1965)
("No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outiawed or exiled or in any
way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful [udgment] of his
peers or by the law of the land."). For a discussion of the Magna Carta's origins, and a
useful collection of scholarly materials on the subject, see R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and
the ius commune, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 297 (1999).
19 See Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044,
1048-52 (1984).
20 See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
21 This traditional distinction between right and privilege was famously stated byJus-
tice Holmes in McAullife v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892), where he
quipped that a dismissed policeman "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he
has no constitutional right to be a policeman." Id. at 517; see also McCormick v. Oklahoma
City, 236 U.S. 657, 659-60 (1915) (finding that a government breach of contract is not,
without more, a deprivation of property because there is no right to such a contract).
22 The welfare benefits cases are a striking example of this shift away from the right-
privilege distinction. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970). But see Rod-
ney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price
of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1982) (arguing that the distinction is still used
in due process analysis).
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court took up the task of giving "some
meaning" to the scope of constitutional property in Board of Regents v.
Roth,23 and its companion Perry v. Sindermann.2 4 At issue in both Roth
and Sindermann was the extent to which employees of public universi-
ties were entitled to due process before termination or nonrenewal of
their employment contracts. 25 The Court's resolution rested largely
on an analysis of the teachers' respective contracts. 26 While acknowl-
edging that the protections of the Due Process Clause must extend to
more than "actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money,"27 the
Court concluded that "the range of interests protected ... is not infi-
nite."28 The Court reasoned that property interests, as protected by
due process, rest on a "legitimate claim of entitlement," rather than a
"unilateral expectation" that the interests will continue to exist.29
Thus, Roth, who was employed for a fixed term, had no legitimate
claim to continued employment;30 Sindermann, in contrast, by virtue
of his implied long-term contract, had a property interest that could
not be taken absent the protections of due process.31
Although the Roth and Sindermann opinions were cast in the lan-
guage of contract, 32 subsequent decisions examining the scope of pro-
cedural protections arising from government contracts have struggled
with how to apply the doctrine. 33 The issue has not been whether, as
a matter of legal principle, contracts may give rise to constitutionally
protected property. The Roth Court settled that question when it
23 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
24 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
25 See Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 596; Roth, 408 U.S. at 566.
26 See Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 599-603 (discussing the significance of a quasi-contrac-
tual employment relationship); Roth, 408 U.S. at 566 n.1, 578 (analyzing the contractual
provisions governing the employment relationship).
27 Roth, 408 U.S. at 572.
28 Id. at 570.
29 Id. at 577. For a critique of entitlement analysis as being too restrictive in the scope
of interests protected, see Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property, "62 CORNELL L.
REv. 405, 409 (1977) (arguing that due process protects "all interests valued by sensible
men").
30 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 578.
31 See Sindermann, 408 U.S. 602-03. The Supreme Court did not rule specifically on
whether Sindermann's employment relationship gave rise to an implied contract (an issue
governed by state law), id. at 602 n.7, but it nevertheless affirmatively resolved the question
as to whether such a contractual relationship with the government, once proven, would
give rise to a constitutionally protected property interest. See id. at 602-03.
32 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
33 See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.3.1 (3d ed.
1999); see also Leonard Kreynin, Breach of Contract As a Due Process Violation: Can the Constitu-
tion Be a Font of Contract Law , 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1098, 1102-17 (1990) (reviewing some of
the relevant case law in this area); Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Prop-
erty, 86 VA. L. REv. 885, 990 (2000) (attributing at least part of the problem to a difference
in how the Constitution treats the federal government in the Fifth Amendment, and the
states in the Fourteenth Amendment).
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sought to define constitutional property by looking at whether an in-
dividual has an entitlement under state law:
34
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitu-
tion. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure cer-
tain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits.
3 5
Thus, under Roth, a contractual relationship giving rise to an enforce-
able claim under state contract law may also support a constitutional
claim subsequent to a deprivation of property without due process.
3 6
Many courts, however, have hesitated to apply the logic of Roth, as
exemplified in Sindermann, to contracts outside of the traditional em-
ployment context. For example, despite the Supreme Court's conclu-
sion in Roth that the weight of an interest has no bearing on whether it
is constitutionally protected by due process,37 lower courts have at-
tempted to distinguish among various types of contracts based on
their apparent relative importance to the employee and the related
status conferred.
38
Frequently, courts have applied a formal approach, which catego-
rizes service and supply contracts as distinct from employment con-
tracts, in order to differentiate "'mere' contracts" from
constitutionally protected property interests. 39 The Ninth Circuit's
decision in San Bernardino Physicians' Services Medical Group, Inc. v.
County of San Bernardino is instructive. 40 The dispute centered around
a four-year fixed-term contract between the county and the physicians
34 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
35 Id. at 577.
36 Some limitations, of course, exist on the extent to which state entitlement schemes
can confer constitutional protection. For example, while state law governs whether an
entitlement exists, the question of constitutional protection remains distinctly one of fed-
eral law. Ultimately, federal law appropriately determines the scope of protection-the
process afforded-rather than the existence of an entitlement. See Henri G. Minette, San
Bernardino Physicians' Services Medical Group, Inc. v. County of San Bernardino: Constitu-
tionally Protected Public Contract Property Interests Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 74 MINN. L. REv.
879, 887-88 (1990).
37 The Court noted that the weight of an interest is relevant to the question of how
much process is due, but "to determine whether due process requirements apply in the
first place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake." 408
U.S. at 570-71 (citation omitted).
38 See, e.g., Vail v. Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435, 1440 (7th Cir. 1983). Moreover, the
Supreme Court has spoken to this issue only infrequently, and with little illumination. See
Bd. of Educ. v. Vail, 466 U.S. 377 (1984) (per curiam), affg by an equally divided court 706
F.2d 1435 (7th Cir. 1983). For a discussion of Vail, see infra text accompanying notes
63-66.
39 See Mid-Am. Waste Sys. v. City of Gary, 49 F.3d 286, 289-91 (7th Cir. 1995) (discuss-
ing, but ultimately rejecting, the formal approach of other circuits).
40 825 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1986).
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to provide services in the county-run hospital, which could only be
terminated for cause.41 The court proceeded to distinguish personal
employment contracts and service contracts on the basis of "the im-
portance of the interest to the holder as an individual."'42 An individ-
ual, the court reasoned, has a "right . . . not to be deprived of
employment that he or she has been guaranteed." Such a right "is
more easily characterized as a civil right, meant to be protected [by
due process], than are many other contractual rights. ' 43 Finally, in
rejecting the group's claim, the court summarized:
[T] here may be great variety in the types of state-secured enti-
tlements subject to constitutional protection. Yet[,] the farther the
purely contractual claim is from an interest as central to the individ-
ual as employment, the more difficult it is to extend it constitutional
protection without subsuming the entire state law of public
contracts.
44
Although the court did recognize that a contract may give rise to a
constitutionally protected property interest, 45 and indeed left open
the possibility that some service contracts could warrant due process
protection, 46 it nevertheless rested its decision largely on the "pre-
ferred position of employment contracts" as the "prime protected
category.,
47
Other circuits have approached the issue less formally, looking
instead at the nature of the employment relationship and the reliance
incurred by the employee. For example, the Second Circuit, in S &D
Maintenance Co. v. Goldin,48 articulated a standard that has been widely
followed throughout other circuits: only those public contracts involv-
ing "extreme dependence" or "permanence" give rise to protected sta-
tus. 49  The court distinguished between "ordinary commercial
41 See id. at 1405-06.
42 Id. at 1409.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 1409-10 (citations omitted).
45 See id at 1407-08.
46 See id. at 1409 ("[Wie do not suggest that employment contracts are the only kind
that may be entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection."). Yet the court also appar-
ently felt that its very consideration of the matter was sufficient to require explanation:
"Our decision not to affirm summarily on the ground that this case is at bottom one for
breach of contract does not mean that we minimize the danger of federalizing state con-
tract law." Id. at 1408 n.3.
47 Id. at 1409.
48 844 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1988).
49 Id. at 966. The Second Circuit's standard has been frequently applied by other
courts of appeal and by the lower courts. See, e.g., Omni Behavioral Health v. Miller, 285
F.3d 646, 652 (8th Cir. 2002); DeBoer v. Pennington, 206 F.3d 857, 869 (9th Cir. 2000),
vacated by City of Bellingham v. DeBoer, 532 U.S. 992 (2001); Unger v. Nat'l Residents
Matching Program, 928 F.2d 1392, 1399 (3d Cir. 1991); Elsag Bailey, Inc. v. City of Detroit,
975 F. Supp 993,998 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Women's Dev. Corp. v. City of Central Falls, 968 F.
Supp. 786, 789 (D.R.I. 1997); Green v. District of Columbia, 1991 WL 251936, at *7
1050 [Vol. 89:1044
THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC CONTRACTS
contract[s],"' 50 and those forms of property previously recognized as
protected. Due process, the court noted, is implicated only in "con-
nection with a state's revocation of a status, an estate within the public
sphere. ... 51 Thus, according to the court, the city contractor had
no property interest because its contract with the government "[did]
not provide it with entitlements within the traditional understanding
of Roth."
52
Although one could read the court's ruling in S & D Maintenance
narrowly to preclude only those claims resting on contracts termina-
ble at will,53 subsequent decisions have instead focused equally on de-
pendence and permanence as indicia of protected status. 54 Thus,
when analyzing an employee's alleged property interest in a specific
employment position, one court has stated that a court must weigh
"the importance to the holder of the right" to determine which inter-
ests are protected. 55 Further, in Vartan v. Nix,5 6 the court held that an
agreement terminable only for cause did not establish the type of per-
manence conceived of in S & D Maintenance.57 Likewise, in Rite Aid of
Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Houstoun,58 the court rejected a corporation's al-
leged property interest in a state prescription drug program that was
secured by a contract assumed to be terminable only for cause.59 In
doing so, the court stated that "this commercial contract between the
Commonwealth and a nationwide corporation does not involve the
'extreme dependence' necessary to support a due process claim."
60
Similar considerations have reigned in other circuits, which,
while not directly following either the Ninth Circuit's formal ap-
proach in San Bernardino or the Second Circuit's formulation in S & D
Maintenance, reached substantially similar results. For example, the
Seventh Circuit, which has repeatedly faced the public contracts di-
lemma, has applied an arguably more expansive notion of property in
(D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1991); Trimec, Inc. v. Zale Corp., 1990 WL 103647, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 2,
1990).
50 S & D Maint. Co., 844 F.2d at 966.
51 Id. (footnote omitted).
52 Id. at 967.
5- That is, the narrow reading of the court's holding is that S & D had no legitimate
entitlement because its contract did not provide only for-cause termination. See id. at
967-68. In that way, S & D's entitlement was akin to Roth's, but not to to Sindermann's.
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
54 See, e.g., Ezekwo v. NYC Health & Hosps. Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 782-86 (2d Cir.
1991); Tucker v. Darien Bd. of Educ., 222 F. Supp. 2d 202, 204-07 (D. Conn. 2002).
55 Ezekwo, 940 F.2d at 783 (quoting Brown v. Brienen, 772 F.2d 360, 364 (7th Cir.
1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56 980 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
57 Id. at 140-41 ("We disagree with plaintiff that a right to procedural due process
exists simply because the public entity may not abrogate the contract at will.").
58 998 F. Supp. 522 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
59 See id. at 530.
60 Id. at 531 (citing Vartan v. Nix, 980 F. Supp. 139, 140-41 (E.D. Pa. 1997)).
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conducting its due process analysis. 6' In particular, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has been willing to expand due process protection to fixed-term
employment contracts, rather than limiting protection only to long-
term contracts akin to tenure. 62 Accordingly, in Vail v. Board of Educa-
tion,63 the court held that a premature termination of a two-year em-
ployment contract was a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable
property interest. 64 Stating that due process "protects the individual
from arbitrary and capricious conduct and legitimizes governmental
action when exercised through proper channels,"65 the court con-
cluded that no distinction could be drawn between the situations
presented in Vail and Sindermann.
66
Yet the Seventh Circuit's approach, which remains firmly linked
to notions of individual employment, assures that service contractors
and corporations will have difficulty stating a due process claim be-
cause "[w]hether an interest is . . . substantial [enough to warrant
protection] depends on the security with which it is held ... and its
importance to the holder. '67 As such, claims by service contractors,
whose employment relationship generally will be accorded less solici-
tude, may appear to "have nothing to do with civil rights as ordinarily
understood."
68
Most lower courts, then, have had trouble applying Roth's entitle-
ment analysis in the sphere of public contracts. Although the doc-
trine has gradually expanded beyond the confines of tenure, the
results have been inconsistent. Because public contractors often do
not present the same reliance concerns that due process traditionally
protects, courts more easily reach the conclusion that these claimants
have no entitlement. 69 This is also due in part to the judiciary's un-
derstandable desire to check the federalization of state contract dis-
putes70 and its conviction that the "Constitution must not be
61 See Mid-Am. Waste Sys., Inc. v. City of Gary, 49 F.3d 286, 289-90 (7th Cir. 1995)
(comparing various approaches within the circuits and noting that the Seventh Circuit has
defined property as anything that is "'securely and durably yours'" (citation omitted)).
62 See, e.g., Hostrop v. Bd. of Junior Coll. Dist. No. 515, 471 F.2d 488, 494 (7th Cir.
1972).
63 706 F.2d 1435 (7th Cir. 1983).
64 See id. at 1438.
65 Id.
66 See id. at 1437-38.
67 Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 364 (7th Cir. 1983).
68 Id. at 362-63.
69 These reliance concerns are not unimportant, but they are misplaced. Indeed,
reliance is an appropriate consideration in the overall due process analysis, but it speaks to
the "weight" of the interest, not to its "nature." See supra note 37 (noting that courts should
look to the nature of the interest in determining whether or not due process protections
apply in the first place).
70 See, e.g., Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[A] wholesale federali-
zation of state public contract law seems far afield from the great purposes of the [D]ue
[P]rocess [C]lause."); S & D Maint. Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 966 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he
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trivialized by being dragged into every personnel dispute in state and
local government."71 However, because such concerns are not prop-
erly part of Roth's entitlement analysis, 72 they serve only to compound
the inconsistency the courts have already exhibited in their treatment
of due process claims.
B. Determining What Process is Due
Although determining the existence of a constitutionally pro-
tected interest is an important threshold matter, 73 the question of
what process is due is of greater consequence. Certainly this has been
the case in the breach of public contract context, as most courts, hesi-
tant to accord the status of constitutional property to nonemployment
contracts, have nevertheless attempted to resolve the issue by assum-
ing that a property interest is at stake, but that the availability of a
breach of contract claim is itself sufficient process.
7 4
In Mathews v. Eldridge,75 the Supreme Court outlined a tripartite
balancing test for weighing the competing interests at stake in the
course of determining what process the government must afford a
property holder before deprivation. Under this framework, a court
must consider (1) the private interest impacted, (2) the risk of an
erroneous determination under current procedures and the added
benefit of any additional process, and (3) the government's interest,
including the increased administrative burden.7 6 A property holder
must receive some form of predeprivation process where the private
interest outweighs the government's interest.77 Otherwise, some form
of postdeprivation process-including only the mere possibility of a
remedy in court-will be constitutionally sufficient. 78 Importantly,
doctrinal implications of constitutionalizing all public contract rights would raise substan-
tial concerns.. . ."); San Bernardino Physicians' Servs. Med. Group, Inc. v. County of San
Bernardino, 825 F.2d 1404, 1408 (9th Cir. 1987) ("It is neither workable nor within the
intent of [§] 1983 to convert every breach of contract claim against a state into a federal
claim."); Brown, 722 F.2d at 364 ("[Wie must bear in mind that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was not intended to shift the whole of the public law of the states into the federal
courts."). For discussion of the merits of the federalization concern, see infra Part III.C.
71 Brown, 722 F.2d at 365.
72 See supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text (discussing the Roth entitlement
analysis).
73 See, e.g., Mid-Am. Waste Sys., Inc. v. City of Gary, 49 F.3d 286, 289 (7th Cir. 1995).
74 See e.g., DeBoer v. Pennington, 287 F.3d 748, 749-50 (9th Cir. 2002); Reich, 883
F.2d at 242; Brown, 722 F.2d at 365-66; cf Empire Transit Mix, Inc. v. Giuliani, 37 F. Supp.
2d 331, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
75 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
76 See id. at 335.
77 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-45 (1985) (hold-
ing that a government employee could not be terminated without some prior process be-
cause the employee's interest outweighed the government's interest in immediate
termination).
78 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348-49.
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the determination as to what process is due must be "flexible,"79 and
"the timing and content of the notice and the nature of the hearing
will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing inter-
ests involved."80
Accordingly, in the public contracts context, not all breaches re-
quire predeprivation process. In those cases where postdeprivation
process is sufficient, the Mathews balancing test remains crucial in de-
termining what form of postdeprivation process is due.81 Frequently,
for example, a postdeprivation hearing may be all that is warranted
where the government has a strong interest in immediate action, such
as when an emergent situation threatens public safety.8 2 Such in-
stances, however, are relatively rare: "We tolerate some exceptions tro
the general rule requiring predeprivation notice and hearing, but
only in 'extraordinary situations where some valid governmental inter-
est is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the
event.' ",83
Not all deprivations, however, are amenable to the orderly re-
quirements of due process. Indeed, where the government's action is
not deliberate, requiring process would be an impossibility.8 4 And
where the deprivation has already occurred, providing notice and an
opportunity for a hearing would be merely an empty formality.8 5
Thus, in a series of cases the Supreme Court has responded to these
realities by outlining when a postdeprivation remedy in court will itself
79 Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
80 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (citation omitted).
81 Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (finding that welfare recipi-
ent's substantial dependence warrants comprehensive predeprivation process), with Ma-
thews, 424 U.S. at 340-41 (holding disabled worker's reliance insufficient to warrant
elaborate pretermination procedures).
82 See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240-41 (1988) (affirming
immediate suspension of bank officer where public confidence in banking system could be
at risk without his immediate termination); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago,
211 U.S. 306, 319-320 (1908) (affirming state health officials' seizure of allegedly contami-
nated foodstuffs without a preliminary hearing).
83 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (quoting
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84 See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986) (holding that due process was
not implicated where the state acted unintentionally); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
532-33 (1984) (holding that intentional deprivation of property did not require
predeprivation process where the act was "random" and "unauthorized").
85 See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540-41 (1981) (holding that accidental loss of a
prisoner's property did not implicate predeprivation process), overruled by Daniels v. Wil-
liams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676-78 (1977) (holding that
public schools could inflict corporal punishment on children without predeprivation pro-
cess, and, where the punishment was unjustified, a subsequent tort remedy was all the
process due to an injured child).
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serve as sufficient process.8 6 In Parratt v. Taylo8 7 the Court empha-
sized that remedial or compensatory schemes may appropriately sat-
isfy due process: "We may reasonably conclude ... that the existence
of an adequate state remedy to redress property damage inflicted by
state officers avoids the conclusion that there has been any constitu-
tional deprivation of property without due process of law within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 8 State remedies, then,
may negate the existence of a civil rights claim because they provide a
form of postdeprivation process.
8 9
Although developed for application to unauthorized govern-
ment-caused torts, courts have consistently applied the logic of Parratt
to intentional breaches of contract in the course of determining what
process is due to those with whom the government contracts. Some
have done so explicitly,90 while others have nominally distinguished
Parratt as a rule that applies only to accidental deprivations, but have
nevertheless applied its holding.91 Because the nature of the property
interest at stake arises from a contractual agreement, courts have de-
fined the issue not as a lack of process, but rather as "a simple action
for breach of contract for which the state provides a complete and
adequate remedy."9 2 Moreover, because the root issue is a pecuniary
deprivation (as compared, for example, to a physical deprivation),
courts have minimized the importance of providing process before
the deprivation, and have been comforted by the availability of an
eventual monetary remedy: "The interest here is monetary-and, un-
like the circumstances of the welfare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly....
no one is at risk of starvation. . . .93
II
LujAN v. G & G FRE SPRINKLERS, INC.
The Supreme Court has infrequently spoken on the issue of what
process government contracts should receive. Although the 1970s saw
86 For a detailed discussion of the relevant cases, see Rodney A. Smolla, The Displace-
ment of Federal Due Process Claims by State Tort Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zim-
merman Brush Company, 1982 U. ILL. L. Rev. 831.
87 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
88 Id. at 542 (quoting Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1975)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
89 See, e.g., supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing two civil rights cases
where a state court remedy was all the process that was due).
90 See, e.g., Ramsey v. Bd. of Educ., 844 F.2d 1268, 1272-74 (6th Cir. 1988); Empire
Transit Mix, Inc. v. Giuliani, 37 F. Supp. 2d 331, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[Parratt] holds that
the existence of an adequate state remedy precludes a procedural due process
claim .... ).
91 See, e.g., Mid-Am. Waste Sys., Inc. v. City of Gary, 49 F.3d 286, 291 (7th Cir. 1995).
92 Casey v. Depetrillo, 697 F.2d 22, 23 (1st Cir. 1983).
93 Mid-Am. Waste, 49 F.3d at 292 (citation omitted).
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a tremendous flood of due process cases through the Court, the doc-
trine has largely stabilized in the decades since, with only "occasional
squabbles ...about the margins of the doctrine and sporadic dis-
agreements over its specific application." 94 The Court's last opportu-
nity to speak clearly on the subject, nearly twenty years ago in Board of
Education v. Vail,95 resulted in a short per curiam affirmance of the
Seventh Circuit by a divided court.96 However, the Court's most re-
cent decision, Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc.,97 coupled with the
decisions of the lower courts, provides an opportunity to reflect on
the manner in which government contracts are accorded due process
and to suggest some tentative solutions to the problems encountered.
A. California's Prevailing Wage Law
California, like many jurisdictions, requires that all contractors
employed on public projects pay their employees a state-determined
prevailing wage. 98 A contractor's failure to abide by the California
Code's provisions may result in the state assessing penalties and with-
holding payments due on the contract. 99
G & G Fire Sprinklers was a California contractor engaged in the
installation of fire sprinkler systems, primarily for public works
projects. 0 0 At issue in the case was a series of projects for which G &
G served as a subcontractor installing fire suppression systems.101 In
1995, California's Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE)
issued withholding notices to the prime contractors, totaling over
$120,000, regarding three projects in which they believed G & G vio-
lated prevailing wage laws. 10 2 In turn, the prime contractors withheld
94 Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 189 (1991).
95 466 U.S. 377 (1984), affg by an equally divided Court 706 F.2d 1435 (7th Cir. 1983).
96 See id.
97 532 U.S. 189 (2001).
98 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1770 (West 2003). Workers must be paid "not less than the
general prevailing rate of per diem wages for work of a similar character in the locality in
which the public work is performed .... Id. § 1771. Similar provisions are enforced, for
example, in New York. See N.Y. LAB. LAw § 220 (McKinney 2002). Federal contractors are
also required to pay employees a predetermined prevailing wage under the Davis-Bacon
Act. See 40 U.S.C. § 276a (2000). The federal statute, however, provides for more thor-
ough postdeprivation process than the California statute. See Ames Constr. Co. v. Dole, 727
F. Supp. 502, 508-09 (D. Minn. 1989) (holding that reimbursement procedures under the
Davis-Bacon Act are in accordance with due process); see also G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v.
Bradshaw, 156 F.3d 893, 904 & n.l (9th Cir. 1998) (comparing the statutes and the proce-
dures required and noting that the federal statute provides "an extensive hearing and ap-
peal structure"), vacated by 526 U.S. 1061 (1999).
99 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1775. California has since amended its Code to provide more
comprehensive hearing procedures subsequent to a withholding. See Lujan, 532 U.S. at
193 n.3.
100 See G & G Fire Sprinklers, 156 F.3d at 898.
101 See id. at 898-99.
102 See id.
1056 [Vol. 89:1044
THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC CONTRA CTS
the requisite amounts from payments due to G & G for work already
performed.
10 3
G & G received no notice of the planned withholding, nor was it
given an opportunity, either before or after the decision, to contest
the DLSE's determination.1 0 4 However, even with such an opportu-
nity, G & G would have had difficulty challenging the determination
because the withholding notices did not clearly articulate the reasons
for the DLSE's conclusion. 10 5 Although the factual basis for the
DLSE's determination remains unclear, 0 6 at a minimum the record
shows that the DLSE believed G & G had improperly classified em-
ployees for the purpose of obtaining lower wage determinations. 10 7 G
& G, however, maintained that it had not violated the wage laws and
that it was being treated unfairly as a result of its nonunion status.'08
Regardless of which party was correct, G & G's only remedy under the
statutory scheme was to seek compensation through a suit for breach
of contract. 10 9
B. Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court Decisions
Because the DLSE's action had a "substantial detrimental effect
on G & G's ability to do business,"'" 0 and presumably because G & G
anticipated further withholdings, G & G sought immediate declara-
tory and injunctive relief.1'1 In its complaint, G & G alleged that the
withholding, absent an opportunity for a hearing, was a violation of
due process. 112 The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of G & G, holding the withholding provisions unconstitutional and
enjoining their enforcement.'
13
On appeal, a divided Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's rul-
ing.114 According to the majority, G & G had a property interest "in
being paid in full for the construction work it [had] completed."
115
The court acknowledged that not all property interests arising from
government contracts are encompassed by the protections of due pro-
103 Id. at 899.
104 See id. at 898, 904.
105 See id. at 899.
106 See id.
107 SeeJoint Appendix 214aa.
108 See Respondent's Brief at 1-2, Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189
(2001) (No. 00-152).
109 For a discussion of the California Labor Code, see supra notes 98-99 and accompa-
nying text.




114 See id. at 908.
115 Id. at 901.
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cess, and that a contrary proposition would "result in the 'federaliza-
tion' of state contract law . *..."116 But, after conceding that the
withholding itself was not a breach of contract, 1 7 the court neverthe-
less attempted to distinguish a mere contractual dispute from a dis-
pute over the manner in which a state exercises its regulatory
power."18 The California Labor Code's withholding provision violated
due process not because it authorized a summary withholding, but
rather because it offered no later opportunity to contest the decision
or to be "heard at a meaningful time [and] in a meaningful man-
ner."119 Importantly, the court rejected the argument that due pro-
cess may be satisfied by a suit in contract: "[W]e apply Parratt and
Hudson only when the state administrative machinery did not and
could not have learned of the deprivation until after it occurred, not
when state officials acted pursuant to state policy and followed state
procedures .. ".."120 Thus, although the state's interests were suffi-
ciently important to allow for a summary withholding, 2 1 due process
required the state to provide a "reasonably prompt hearing of some
sort" after the deprivation.1 22
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's hold-
ing and remanded for further consideration1 23 in light of the Court's
recent decision in American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sulli-
van.124 At issue in Sullivan was a Pennsylvania worker's compensation
provision authorizing private insurers to withhold payments pending
determinations as to whether medical treatments were "reasonable"
and "necessary." 125 Although the Court eventually dismissed the Sulli-
van due process claim by rejecting the respondent's argument that a
statutory authorization to withhold provided an adequate nexus for
finding state action, 126 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion went on to
discuss the nature of the alleged property interest at stake, which, the
116 Id. at 902.
117 Id.
118 See id.
119 Id. at 904.
120 Id. at 904 n.9 (quoting Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir.
1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the case of G & G, this argument was fur-
ther bolstered by the fact that as a subcontractor, G & G could not directly sue the state.
Subcontractors may only seek assignment from the prime contractor, see id. at 898, or sue
the prime contractor directly for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing or
under the theory of equitable subrogation. See id. at 904 n.9.
121 See id. at 903-904 (balancing the competing interests in accordance with Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
122 Id. at 904.
123 Bradshaw v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 526 U.S. 1061 (1999).
124 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
125 Id. at 43.
126 See id. at 52 ("Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquies-
cence of the State is not state action." (citations omitted)).
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Court stated, the lower court had "fundamentally misappre-
hended."' 27 Unlike Goldbergor Mathews, the claimants in Sullivan had
not established their entitlement to continued payments, but rather
only to those payments eventually found to be reasonable and neces-
sary.128 Until such a determination was made, they had no constitu-
tionally protected property interest in the payments.1 29
The decision further noted a potential distinction between the
"property interest in [the respondents'] claims for payment, as dis-
tinct from the payments themselves ....,"130 Due process would only
require that the state afford some procedural protections before fi-
nally rejecting such claims.13' Although this distinction was not actu-
ally presented in Sullivan,1312 its importance is highlighted by the
opinions of the concurring Justices who sought to clarify-and per-
haps limit-3 3-the Court's holding. For example, Justice Ginsburg
noted that the Court's discussion was limited to the specific circum-
stances presented and affirmed that due process would generally re-
quire fair procedures for the settlement of claims. 134 Justice Breyer,
joined by Justice Souter, added further qualification by stressing that
in certain circumstances, prior receipt of payments may be sufficient
to create an entitlement to future payments. 13 5 Finally,Justice Stevens
emphasized that a claimant's right, "whether described as a 'claim' for
payment or a 'cause of action' . . is unquestionably a species of prop-
erty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."13
6
Notwithstanding the decision in Sullivan, G & G was successful
again on remand to the Ninth Circuit, which distinguished Sullivan
and again held California's statute unconstitutional. 13 7 Noting that
the "definition of a protected property interest often includes a tem-
poral component,"' 38 the court emphasized that its prior opinion did
not support G & G's claim for immediate payment pending a determi-
nation of the dispute. 39 Rather, the court's previous holding only
required that the state provide G & G with a procedure for resolving
127 Id. at 58.
128 See id. at 60.
129 See id at 61.
130 Id. at 61 n.13.
131 See id.
132 The challengers of the statutory scheme had not alleged a property interest in their
claims for payment, but only in the payments themselves. See id.
133 See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 33, § 9.4.
134 See Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 61-62 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
135 See id. at 63 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
136 Id. at 63 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
137 G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 204 F.3d 941, 943-44 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd
sub nom. Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189 (2001).
138 Id. at 944 n.1.
139 See id. at 943.
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the dispute.1 40 As such, the court believed that its prior opinion "fit[ ]
comfortably within the analytic framework set forth in Sullivan."' 41 In
dissent, Judge Kozinski wrote that "Sullivan fits the majority's rationale
about as comfortably as Cinderella's slipper on the wicked step-sister's
foot."
14 2
On appeal, a unanimous Supreme Court agreed with Judge
Kozinski's characterization, and reversed.1 43 As a threshold matter,
the Court assumed, but did not decide, that G & G did have a prop-
erty interest in its claim for payment.' 44 The Court then considered
whether a breach of contract claim in state court, as mandated by the
statutory scheme, was sufficient to protect that interest.145 According
to the Court, prior decisions outlining when a prompt postdeprivation
hearing would be required,1 46 upon which the Court of Appeals re-
lied, were inapposite because in those cases the entitlement had al-
ready vested.1 47 The Court explained: "In each of these cases, the
claimant was denied a right by virtue of which he was presently enti-
tled either to exercise ownership dominion over real or personal
property, or to pursue a gainful occupation. Unlike those claimants,
[G & G] has not been denied any present entitlement.
148
Accordingly, like the complainants in Sullivan, the withholding of
payments here did not deprive G & G of any property to which it was
constitutionally entitled. Furthermore, any process due G & G for the
settlement of its claims, which the Court assumed to be a constitution-
ally protected property interest, could be readily had in the state
courts. Thus, the Court stated: "We hold that if California makes ordi-
nary judicial process available to respondent for resolving its contrac-
tual dispute, that process is due process.
" 149
140 See id.
141 Id. at 944. Further, the court emphasized that "[its] opinion adopt[ed] the ap-
proach explicitly preserved by the Sullivan majority and unequivocally adopted in Justice
Ginsburg's concurrence." Id. at 943.
142 Id. at 944 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
143 See Lujan, 532 U.S. 189.
144 See id. at 195 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)).
145 See id. at 197-99.
146 See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1988); Barry v.
Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66 (1979); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337,
348-49 (Black, J., dissenting) (1969); United States v. James Daniel Good Prop., 971 F.2d
1376, 52-62 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
147 See Lujan, 532 U.S. at 195-96.
148 Id. at 196.
149 Id. at 197.
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III
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
A. The Problems with G & G Fire Sprinklers
Ultimately, the Supreme Court's analysis in G & G Fire Sprinklers is
disappointing. Presented with the opportunity to clarify the status of
public contracts within the due process framework, the Court chose
instead to avoid the doctrinal inconsistencies that have plagued the
lower courts. Although it assumed that G & G had a property interest
in its claim for payment, the Court resolved the due process claim not
by holding that G & G had received sufficient postdeprivation process,
but rather by holding that no deprivation had yet occurred. 150 This
logic is unsettling because it too easily allows the courts to avoid con-
sidering what due process requires. Indeed, it is perhaps telling that
under the Court's due process analysis, it need not apply, nor even
mention, the Mathews balancing test.
151
The Ninth Circuit's resolution is preferable because it eschewed
conceiving of G & G's property interest in the Blackstonian terms of
occupation or dominion. 15 2 Instead, it recognized that G & G had a
property interest in its claim for payment that it could pursue either
through administrative or judicial procedures.1 53 As such, the Ninth
Circuit's decision was fully in accordance with the fundamental teach-
ings of Roth that "property interests protected by procedural due pro-
cess extend well beyond actual ownership .... -154 After determining
that G & G had a protected property interest, the court appropriately
applied the Mathews balancing test.' 55 Using that approach, the court
determined that under these circumstances due process required
some form of prompt postdeprivation process-some meaningful op-
portunity to be heard before G & G would be forced to sue for breach
of contract.'
56
The Supreme Court's resolution regarding G & G's property in-
terest has potentially far-reaching effects. Construed broadly, the
150 See id, at 196 (noting that "[G & G] has not been denied any present
entitlement ... ).
151 See id. at 195-99.
152 Compare G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 204 F.3d 941, 944 n.1 (9th Cir.
2000) ("[T]he definition of a protected property interest often includes a temporal com-
ponent." (citation omitted)), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S.
189 (2001), with Lujan, 532 U.S. at 196 ("[Cllaimant ... [is not] presently entitled . . . to
exercise ownership dominion.").
153 See G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 156 F.3d 893, 901-03 (9th Cir. 1998),
vacated by 506 U.S. 1061 (1999); see also G & G Fire Sprinklers, 204 F.3d at 943-44 (reinstat-
ing the court's prior decision and implicitly finding that G & G had a property interest in
its claim for payment).
154 Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
155 See G & G Fire Sprinklers, 156 F.3d at 903-04.
156 Id. at 904.
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holding encroaches on the Roth-Mathews entitlement-process frame-
work. What distinction can logically be drawn between the position of
a government employee and a public works contractor who have each
been allegedly terminated without cause? Under the traditional ru-
bric, a valid distinction lies in the process that is due. The employee,
who exhibits greater reliance, will be accorded greater process, includ-
ing at least some minimal predeprivation notice or informal hearing,
perhaps coupled with a more substantial and prompt postdeprivation
procedure. 157 The contractor, on the other hand, who presumably
exhibits less extreme dependence, 158 is entitled only to prompt
postdeprivation procedures1 5 9 or a compensatory suit for breach of
contract in state court.1
60
Of course, this analysis only applies where the subjects have a
valid property interest (i.e., arising from a present entitlement), and
the Supreme Court found that contractors like G & G do not have
such an interest.1 6' The Court's opinion nevertheless attempts to
maintain the traditional Mathews-type framework by arguing that, un-
like the contractor, the employee exercises a "present entitlement.'
'1 62
However, the logic of this argument is equally applicable against the
employee: just as G & G has a property interest only in its claim for
payment, so too may the government employee's interest be reduced
to merely a claim for payment.
16 3
The Court's ruling is also problematic because it creates a de
facto exhaustion requirement. To be sure, there may be instances in
which a contractor, and perhaps even an employee, may see its claim
extinguished prior to seeking a judicial remedy. In such cases, ex-
haustion would not be an issue.164 Nonetheless, by defining the prop-
157 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-47 (1985) (hold-
ing that a government employee could not be terminated without some prior process and
a post-termination hearing).
158 See supra Part I.A.
159 See, e.g., G & G Fire Sprinklers, 156 F.3d at 904.
160 See, e.g., S & D Maint. Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 967-68 (2d Cir. 1988).
161 See Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, 532 U.S. 189, 196 (2001) (assuming only that G
& G had a property interest in its claim for payment).
162 See id.
163 The Court's approach, which emphasizes the conditional nature of a contractor's
property interest, seems to be in tension with its own settled principles. For example,
although a customer's right to continued utility service depends upon payment of the
charges properly due, "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's protection of 'property'[ ] ... has
never been interpreted to safeguard only the rights of undisputed ownership." Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972).
164 See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436-37 (1982) (holding
that the state's failure to schedule an administrative hearing within the statute of limita-
tions was a deprivation of property without due process); see also Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 64-65 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(suggesting that exhaustion is not required where employees were not notified that a re-
quest for utilization review would suspend the employee's ability to present her case).
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erty interest as a claim for payment, and by requiring a final
adjudication of the claim before a deprivation can be said to exist, the
Court's ruling would seem to contravene, at least in spirit, the princi-
ple of Monroe v. Pape that state remedies "need not be first sought and
refused before the federal one is invoked."1 65 While the legal frame-
work does not technically require exhaustion, the G & G Fire Sprinklers
doctrine nevertheless serves to similarly restrict the availability of
§ 1983 actions for contractors.
166
B. The Problems Beyond G & G Fire Sprinklers
The Supreme Court's decision in G & GFire Sprinklers is emblem-
atic of the tension inherent in the Roth entitlement framework. While
all entitlements enforceable at state law are arguably constitutionally
protected property, 67 the federal courts understandably have been
uncomfortable with this unbounded principle.' 68 Therefore, they
have sought to limit public contractors' uses of civil rights claims for
breach of contracts in two ways. First, many courts have hesitated to
give constitutional status to "mere contracts," even though the distinc-
tion separating employment and service contracts is tenuous.1 69
Courts have attempted to use various notions of reliance, depen-
dence, status, or permanence as a means of differentiation.1 70 In do-
ing so, however, they conflate the Roth entitlement analysis with
Mathews balancing-and the results have ranged from marked incon-
sistency1 71 to logical absurdity.
172
165 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961); see also Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (hold-
ing that exhaustion of state remedies is not required before an individual may seek federal
relief under § 1983). For a discussion of the relevant law prior to G & G Sprinklers, see
Smolla, supra note 86.
166 An almost identical argument played at least some part in the court's decision in
Vail v. Board of Education: "[U]nder [the dissent's] analysis[,] Vail still would not be 'de-
prived' of property until the state courts 'refused' [his claim] .... If that is not requiring
exhaustion of state remedies, I do not know what would be an exhaustion requirement."
706 F.2d 1435, 1445-46 (7th Cir. 1983) (Eschbach, J., concurring).
167 See Merrill, supra note 33, at 931-32 (discussing the problem of too much property
under Roth's positivism).
168 See, e.g., Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 362 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting, with some
consternation, that breach of employment contract due process suits "have become an
important part of the business of the federal courts"); supra notes 70-71 and accompany-
ing text.
169 See supra Part I.A.
170 See supra Part I.A.
171 Compare Vai4 706 F.2d at 1439-40 (holding that a state employee was entitled to
continued employment for the period of fixed-term contract), with DeBoer v. Pennington,
287 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that sole employee of service company was not
entitled to continue employment for period of fixed-term contract).
172 One such absurdity is that the existence of due process may depend on the number
of employees working under a public contractor. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Pennington, 206 F.3d
857, 868-71 (9th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that plaintiff would be entitled to due process
protection if his contract with the City were for only his own services, rather than.for the
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Second, courts have attempted to limit the process due by finding
that a compensatory, postdeprivation breach of contract suit is ade-
quate process.1 73 Given that many contractors will not depend solely
on one government contract for their livelihood, it is not surprising
that they will be accorded less process than individual employees. 74
Still, courts should seek to apply Mathews in a flexible manner, consid-
ering the interests at stake rather than the category of contract in state
court. By resting on the notion that contractors' disputes may simply
receive adequate process through a breach of contract claim, they
conflate Mathews interest balancing with the Roth entitlement analysis.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that their results have been similarly
inconsistent.
C. The Current Justifications and Suggested Guidelines
Although the current procedural due process doctrine results in
inconsistencies, this doctrinal development has not been without a
strong rationale. Indeed, courts faced with these issues have been re-
markably consistent in their reasoning, if not their outcomes. 1 75 Ulti-
mately, however, these justifications alone are unpersuasive.
First, courts have primarily considered the proper role of the fed-
eral courts, emphasizing that the "Fourteenth Amendment was not
intended to shift the whole of the public law of the states into the
federal courts."'176 For example, in G & G Fire Sprinklers, the Supreme
Court's opinion conceived of the issue as a "standard breach-of-con-
tract suit ... under California law."1 77 Likewise, both the majority and
dissenting opinions of the Ninth Circuit discussed the problem of fed-
eralizing state contract law as a central issue.178
Such concerns are appropriate. The courts should certainly seek
to "prevent the escalation of every grievance against state and local
government into a constitutional claim."'179 However, these concerns
services of others), vacated sub nom. City of Bellingham v. DeBoer, 532 U.S. 992 (2001); San
Bernardino Physicians' Servs. Med. Group v. County of San Bernardino, 825 F.2d 1404,
1409 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that some professional corporations may be the "alter
ego" of an individual independently contracting with a public agency, and contrasting the
independent individual's contract with a professional corporation's contract with a public
agency).
173 See supra Part I.B.
174 See, e.g., Vartan v. Nix, 980 F. Supp. 138, 141-42 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (denying
predeprivation hearing where the contractor would not be irreparably harmed and where
administrative costs to the state would be "enormous").
175 See supra Part 1.
176 Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 364 (7th Cir. 1983); see also supra notes 70-71 and
accompanying text (discussing the proper role of the federal courts).
177 Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 198 (2001).
178 See G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 156 F.3d 893, 901-02, vacated by 526
U.S. 1061 (1999); id. at 908-09 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
179 Monaghan, supra note 29, at 408 (footnote omitted).
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may currently be given too much weight. Apprehension over the
sheer volume of cases may be unwarranted,1 80 and state remedies may
still properly resolve a majority of cases."8' Further, the current ap-
proach confuses the Mathews balancing framework because it fails to
explain where such federalization concerns should lie. If they accrue
to the government's interest, then surely Mathews balancing will rarely
counsel significant predeprivation process. And if they remain
outside of the Mathews framework, yet still relevant, then that may ac-
count for recent doctrinal inconsistencies. Going forward, courts
should acknowledge the role that these considerations play and
should fashion an appropriate framework accordingly.
Second, although an important consideration, the volume of
cases should not be the courts' primary concern. It may be far more
important to ask why such cases are in federal court seeking vindica-
tion of a civil right. As most courts have framed the issue in these
cases as a breach of contract, rather than a breach of process, a com-
mon refrain from those courts that have rejected public contractors'
due process claims is that "contracting parties . . . [should not be]
governed by the Due Process Clause merely because one of the parties
happens to be a state."182 The logic is that due process is less relevant
when the government participates in the marketplace as a consumer,
because external pressures will adequately constrain arbitrary govern-
ment action.' 8 3 This notion is particularly apparent in Judge Kozin-
ski's Ninth Circuit dissent. After noting that "[n]o one is forced to
comply [with the regulations] unless he agrees to do business with the
state,"'8 4 Judge Kozinski proclaimed: "We can't always expect the gov-
ernment to act with unbounded compassion, patience and generosity.
Indeed, when the government is acting as a commercial entity, taxpay-
ers cajole it to act with all the ferociousness the marketplace de-
mands."'1 5 Yet this notion may only hold true when the government
180 See Minette, supra note 36, at 915-17 (discussing the probable number of cases
involved and concluding that the number would be small).
181 See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981) (holding that a state court
remedy is sufficient where the deprivation was unintentional), overruled by Daniels v. Wil-
liams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
182 G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 204 F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozin-
ski, J., dissenting) (citation omitted), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc.,
532 U.S. 189 (2001); see also id. at 946 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("The majority has not
explained why working on a government contract heightens one's interest in receiving
prompt payment so as to require procedural safeguards not available to other parties that
have a disputed claim under a contract.").
183 See Timothy P. Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," and the Distinction Between Definition
and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEO. L.J. 861, 901-05 (1982); see also Brief of Amici Curiae
Port of Oakland and 54 California Cities at 7 & n.4, Lujan, 532 U.S. 189 (No. 00-152).
184 G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 156 F.3d 893, 909 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 910 n.2.
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functions solely as a proprietor, rather than equally as an enforcer of
public policy.' 86 After all, the government is no ordinary consumer
and it may be appropriately subject to unique restrictions, even when
it participates in the ordinary marketplace.
187
Moreover, because the underlying dispute sounds in contract,
courts may too easily undervalue the importance of providing substan-
tial process. Although it is true that common contract disputes should
not be governed by due process, ending the analysis on this principle
is mere tautology. Courts must go further and endeavor to distinguish
claims that represent a simple breach of contract from those that re-
present a breach of process. For example, it may be appropriate for
courts to resolve disputes relating to bargained-for performance
through traditional contract remedies. However, disputes regarding
the enforcement of a public policy 88 or the existence of an entitle-
ment 8 9 may more likely require the procedural safeguards of due
process.190 To be sure, "one cannot have a property interest in mere
procedures."' 91 Still, it cannot be doubted that it is property that ulti-
mately guarantees such procedures.' 92 Accordingly, courts should not
be troubled that a property-related dispute may give rise to a constitu-
tional claim when the state fails to act in a manner consistent with due
186 See, e.g., Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 507
U.S. 218, 227 (1993) (noting a "distinction between government as regulator and govern-
ment as proprietor"). But see Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8
(1927) (arguing that both government uses of property are coercive).
187 See Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S.
282, 290 (1986) (" [G]overnment occupies a unique position of power in our society, and
its conduct ... is rightly subject to special restraints.").
188 For example, because wage laws are regulatory rather than proprietary, see Dilling-
ham Constr. N. Am., Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 190 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1999), appli-
cation of the California statute at issue in G & G Fire Sprinklers would require procedural
guarantees.
189 See Mid-Am. Waste Sys., Inc. v. City of Gary, 49 F.3d 286, 290 (7th Cir. 1995). Judge
Easterbrook suggests that process is indicated where the dispute relates to whether a condi-
tion of entitlement exists. See id. Thus, while a premature termination could be resolved
through breach of contract remedies, a dispute over an entitlement (e.g., whether
Goldberg is entitled to statutory benefits, or whether G & G is in violation of California's
wage provision law) should be resolved through an appropriate administrative hearing.
190 Under our current entitlement doctrine, property is defined by the nature of the
interest rather than the dispute. See supra Part I. But such considerations could be incor-
porated under the Mathews calculus.
191 See Training Inst., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 937 F. Supp. 743, 748 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(quoting Doe v. Milwaukee County, 903 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1990)).
192 See Gregory S. Alexander, Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German
Example, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 733, 773 (2003); C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to
Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. Rev. 741 (1986); MargaretJane Radin, Property
and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982); Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 329 (1996); William W. Van Alstyne, The Recrudescence of Property Rights
As the Foremost Principle of Civil Liberties: The First Decade of the Burger Court, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1980, at 66.
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process. 193 As Judge Eschbach noted in his Vail concurrence, due
process is intended to govern the relationship between state and citi-
zen, and to assure that the government does not treat individuals in
an arbitrary fashion:'
94
A civil rights action based on the deprivation of due process and a
contract action to recover damages for a breach are independent
remedies. The civil rights action based on deprivation of a property
interest established by the contract seeks vindication for the arbi-
trary manner in which the contract was breached.
195
Conceived of in this manner, such property-based claims have every-
thing "to do with civil rights as ordinarily understood."'
96
CONCLUSION
Our current due process approach to public contracts is problem-
atic. Appropriate concerns for the fundamental scope of due process
and the role of the federal courts have inappropriately resulted in the
development of an inconsistent doctrine and the exclusion of merito-
rious claims. To address this problem, the courts should endeavor to
fashion a remedy that scrutinizes public contracts with a more
nuanced eye and, ultimately, with less trepidation.
193 If one accepts this argument, the criticism and concern that civil rights claims may
award a greater remedy than a simple contract action, see Kreynin, supra note 33, at 1100,
becomes unpersuasive.
194 See Vail v. Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435, 1448 (7th Cir. 1983) (Eschbach, J.,
concurring).
195 I. (Eschbach,J., concurring) (quoting Hostrop v. Bd. ofJunior Coll. Dist. No. 515,
471 F.2d 488, 494 n.15 (7th Cir. 1972)).
196 Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 363 (7th Cir. 1983).
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